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ABSTRACT 
This compilation thesis studies firm responses to tax policy. The essays use 
empirical methods and administrative firm-level data to study issues in public and 
labor economics: how do firms adjust their behavior to incentives caused by policy. 
The results can provide information to guide the design of public policy. 
The first essay studies the effects of a first-employee subsidy in Finland. In 
2007—2011 Finland provided a regional subsidy for hiring the first employee. The 
subsidy was supposed to encourage entrepreneurs to become employers, as over half 
of firms in Finland do not have employees. Using the geographic differences in the 
eligibility to the subsidy and full-population firm data, I study the effects on the 
probability of becoming an employer and several other firm outcomes. I find a zero 
effect on average. This seems to be explained by low take-up of the subsidy: only 
2% of eligible firms that became employers used the subsidy. Descriptive evidence 
supports that restricting the subsidy to full-time employees and low awareness 
decreased the take-up and, hence, the effectiveness of the subsidy. 
The second essay describes a plan for a government-run recruitment subsidy 
experiment. The randomized experiment is supposed to evaluate the effects of a 
recruitment subsidy on the probability of becoming an employer. Following the 
evidence from the first essay, the subsidy is not restricted to a type of employment 
contract and the subsidy covers a percentage of the wage costs in the first year up to 
a threshold. Therefore, expected take-up and effects are larger, and the results of the 
experiment can complement the knowledge from the first essay. The essay makes 
use of administrative firm-level data to plan the experiment and calculate the 
statistical power. 
The third essay studies how firms respond to tax audits. We combine data from 
the Finnish tax administration on all tax audits conducted on firms in 2003—2016 to 
annual firm tax returns. This unique, novel data allows us to follow the tax reporting 
behavior of firms before and after being audited. By comparing the development of 
the audited firms to similar non-audited firms with similar prior development, we 
find that the audited firms significantly increase reported profits and revenue 
persistently after an audit. This means that auditing more firms could increase tax 
revenue in the long run, by increasing firms’ tax compliance.  
KEYWORDS: business taxation, firm behavior, public policy, employment 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämä kokoomaväitöskirja tutkii veropolitiikan vaikutuksia yrityksiin. Esseissä 
tutkitaan julkisen ja työn talouden kysymyksiä käyttämällä empiirisiä menetelmiä ja 
yritystason rekisteriaineistoja: miten yritykset reagoivat julkisen politiikan luomiin 
kannustimiin. Tuloksia voidaan käyttää apuna julkisen politiikan suunnittelussa. 
Ensimmäinen essee tutkii ensimmäisen työntekijän palkkaustuen vaikutuksia 
Suomessa. Vuosina 2007—2011 Suomessa oli tarjolla alueellinen tuki ensimmäisen 
työntekijän palkkaamiseksi. Tuen oli tarkoitus rohkaista yrittäjiä ryhtymään 
työnantajaksi, kun yli puolet Suomen yrityksistä ovat yksinyrittäjiä. Tutkin tuen 
vaikutuksia työnantajaksi ryhtymisen todennäköisyyteen ja muihin yritysten 
tulemiin käyttämällä alueellisia eroja yritysten kelpoisuudessa tukeen ja koko 
yrityspopulaation aineistoa. Tulosten perusteella tuella ei ollut vaikutuksia 
keskimäärin. Tämän näyttäisi selittävän tuen alhainen käyttöaste: vain 2 % 
työnantajaksi ryhtyneistä yrityksistä käytti tukea. Kuvailevan analyysin perusteella 
rajoitus kokoaikaisiin työsuhteisiin ja alhainen tietoisuus tuesta laskivat tuen 
käyttöastetta ja siten tuen vaikuttavuutta.  
Toisessa esseessä kuvaillaan suunnitelma valtion toimeenpanemasta 
rekrytointitukikokeilusta. Satunnaistetun kokeen on tarkoitus arvioida 
rekrytointituen vaikutuksia työnantajaksi ryhtymisen todennäköisyyteen. 
Ensimmäisen esseen näytön perusteella rekrytointitukea ei ole sidottu työsuhteen 
muotoon ja tuki korvaa osuuden palkkakustannuksista ensimmäisen vuoden aikana 
ylärajaan saakka. Tämän takia tuen odotettu käyttöaste ja vaikutukset ovat 
suuremmat ja kokeilun tulokset voivat täydentää ensimmäisen esseen tuottamaa 
tietoa. Esseessä käytetään yritystason rekisteriaineistoja kokeilun suunnittelussa ja 
kokeen tilastollisen voiman laskemisessa. 
Kolmannessa esseessä tutkitaan verotarkastusten vaikutuksia yrityksiin. 
Yhdistämme ainutlaatuisen aineiston kaikista Suomen veroviraston tekemistä 
yritysten verotarkastuksista vuosilta 2003—2016 yritysten vuosittaisiin 
veroilmoituksiin. Näin voimme seurata yritysten veroraportointia ajassa ennen ja 
jälkeen verotarkastuksen. Tarkastettujen yritysten kehityksen vertaaminen 
samankaltaisiin samalla tavalla kehittyneisiin ei-tarkastettuihin yrityksiin paljastaa, 
että tarkastetut yritykset lisäävät merkittävästi ja pysyvästi raportoituja voittoja ja 
liikevaihtoa tarkastuksen jälkeen. Tämä tarkoittaa, että verotarkastusten lisääminen 
voisi tuottaa lisää verotuloja pitkällä aikavälillä lisäämällä yritysten verojen 
raportointia. 
ASIASANAT: yritysverotus, yritysten käyttäytyminen, politiikkavaikutukset, 
työllistämistuet, palkkatuet, verotarkastukset  
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This compilation thesis studies firm responses to tax policy in order to understand
the consequences of policies on firms and society. Governments can use tax policy
to collect revenue or to change behavior in order to, for example, correct market
failures or improve equity. Regardless of the motivation, there is always a trade-off
in policies: any policy has costs in addition to the benefits created. The trade-off
can only be identified by knowing the causal effects of policies. Consequently, the
effects of policies need to be known in order to understand whether the policies
are desirable or not. In addition, understanding the mechanisms or reasons for
the observed effect can provide valuable information in designing more effective
policies.
This thesis consists of an introduction and three empirical essays on the effects
of tax policy on firms. Tax policy is defined here rather broadly; in addition to
taxes, tax policy includes subsidies, which can be considered negative taxes, and
tax system features such as tax enforcement tools, which are used to ensure that
the correct amount of taxes is paid. The theme of the first and second papers is
a subsidy for hiring the first employee or becoming an employer. The subsidy
is meant as an incentive for firms to become employers with the motivation that
it could encourage job creation, and thus increase total employment. The third
essay studies tax audits on firms as a tax enforcement tool. Consequently, the
theme of the third paper is tax evasion and tax audit as a tool used to improve tax
compliance.
The essays in this thesis aim to identify the causal effects of the tax policies
studied, using extensive administrative panel data on the full population of Finnish
firms and causal identification methods. The research is enabled by the existence
of and access to register data on the firms. This kind of micro-level data enables
the development of individual firms to be tracked over time, which is beneficial for
the identification of causal effects. The second paper is an example of a method-
ological benchmark for causal identification, as it describes a plan for a random-
ized field experiment. The first and third essays make use of quasi-experimental
methods. The idea is to find a group of firms that can provide a counterfactual for
the firms that face a specific tax policy treatment.
The essays in this thesis contribute to the field of public economics, especially
empirical public economics and firm behavior. Indeed, tax policy is at the core of
public economics. The topic of tax compliance has received a lot of attention in
the past 20 years and is still a topical research area. Nevertheless, there is little
evidence on firm responses to business-as-usual tax audits. The topic of the first
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and second essays also overlaps with labor economics. The effects of employment
incentives are extensively studied. However, there is still a lack of evidence on the
effects of employment incentives on firms and, especially, non-employer firms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, section 1 introduces
the study of tax policy: how to evaluate the welfare effects of different tax policies
using causal effects, a methodological approach to estimating the causal effects of
policies, and different margins of response and the role of studying mechanisms
behind the causal effects. Secondly, section 2 discusses literature that studies em-
ployment incentives and provides overviews of essays 1 and 2. Lastly, section 3
discusses literature on tax evasion and overviews essay 3. The first section sets the
general framework and motivation for studying firm responses to tax policy. The
second and third sections briefly describe the conceptual background and literature
related to the essays in this thesis.
1 STUDYING TAX POLICY
1.1 Welfare evaluation of policies
How to improve economic welfare in society is the ultimate concern in public eco-
nomics as well as many other fields in economics and, arguably, in policy design.1
Governments can use different tools, including tax policy, in order to improve so-
cial welfare. For example, governments may want to support the creation of jobs
to provide employment and economic prosperity to more people. Whatever the
motive or the tool, there is always a trade-off: any tax policy can cause costs in ad-
dition to the potential benefits. Consequently, a welfare evaluation must consider
the costs and benefits of the policy, in other words the efficiency of the policy.
In this dissertation I consider two tax policies: a subsidy for hiring the first
employee and tax audits. First, a subsidy for hiring the first employee can in-
crease job creation by firms that become employers because of the subsidy. Thus,
it can increase the welfare of employees as well as entrepreneurs if the subsidy
increases their income. However, the subsidy may cause deadweight spending, as
some firms that would have become employers in the absence of the subsidy also
use it. This spending must be financed either by reducing spending on other poli-
cies or by increasing government revenue through taxation, which can have further
1 Although in reality the objectives of different agents in policy-making may differ from this gen-
eral goal of improving economic welfare, as studied in the field of public choice.
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costs through decreased incentives to work. Second, tax audits may increase tax
compliance, increasing government revenue. However, increased tax compliance
means higher effective tax rates, which, again, can have a negative effect on rev-
enue through weaker incentives. How, then, can the ultimate welfare effects be
evaluated?
A simple, unified framework for evaluating the welfare effects of policies is
described in Hendren (2016), Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) and Finkelstein
and Hendren (2020). They argue that the causal effects of a policy are sufficient for
welfare evaluation. The factor that determines the welfare impacts of any policy is
called the marginal value of public funds (MVPF), which can be calculated using
the causal, behavioral effects of the policy. The framework is closely related to
the result in Feldstein (1999), which shows that (under some simplifying assump-
tions) the welfare effect of taxation can be determined by a sufficient statistic: the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates.
The MVPF is defined by the ratio of the benefits created by a policy to its effect
on government spending:
MVPF =
Bene f iciaries′ willingness to pay
Net cost to government
(1)
(Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Consequently, the MVPF measures how
much the policy increases welfare per unit of spending on it, or, as formulated in
Finkelstein and Hendren (2020), the “bang for the buck”.
The denominator in equation 1 is the net cost of the policy or, in other words,
the causal effect of the policy on government revenue. Hendren (2016) calls this
total effect on government revenue the policy elasticity. Consequently, it measures
how much a change in the policy changes revenue – a close relative of the elas-
ticity of taxable income, which is a sufficient statistic for the welfare effects of
taxation. The total net effect of a policy on government revenue can be divided
into a mechanical effect and fiscal externality (FE). This can be normalized by the
spending on the policy. Thus, the normalized net cost to the government is 1+FE.
The mechanical effect simply means the spending on the policy. In the case of the
first-employee subsidy, it is the total amount of the subsidies paid to firms.
The fiscal externality arises through the behavioral responses to the policy that
affect government revenue. This is determined by the causal effects of the pol-
icy. (Finkelstein and Hendren, 2020) For example, the first-employee subsidy can
increase employment, and thus the wage costs of a firm, which increases pay-
roll and income taxes related to the wage, increasing government tax revenue. In
addition, the subsidy may help entrepreneurs to grow their businesses and prof-
itability, increasing firm taxes paid on value added and profit. Consequently, the
fiscal externality arises from the firm responses to the policy: employment, value
added, and turnover that generate tax revenue for the government. In the case of
the subsidy, the fiscal externality is negative and thus decreases the net costs of
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the policy. To determine the fiscal externality, only the causal effect on the taxable
income of the new employees and the firm is needed. In the case of the tax audits,
the denominator consists of the costs of the tax audits (mechanical cost) and the
subsequent effect on the reported taxes (behavioral effect).
The numerator in equation 1 measures the marginal benefits of the policy de-
fined as the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) of the beneficiaries of the pol-
icy.2 The beneficiaries include those directly affected by the policy, but can also
include those indirectly affected if the policy has externalities. The MWTP, how-
ever, does not need to depend on the causal effects of the policy. The simple case
is when the policy is a cash transfer, for example a change in taxes: the marginal
willingness to pay is simply equal to the amount of the cash transfer. This can,
again, be normalized by the total spending on the policy. The normalized MWTP
of a tax change, for example, is just one euro (or dollar). (Finkelstein and Hendren,
2020)
The above description of the marginal willingness to pay holds when i) the pol-
icy change is small, ii) the behavior of the agents targeted is privately optimal, and
iii) the value of the policy equals its costs. Firstly, for large effects, the demand for
the policy needs to be known to determine the MWTP. Secondly, additional as-
sumptions about measuring welfare from behavioral welfare economics is needed
if there are behavioral agents, as their welfare may differ from their willingness
to pay. 3 Third, if the policy is an in-kind transfer (e.g. education, food stamps)
it may not be equal to the spending on the policy, because the beneficiaries may
not be willing to pay the cost of the in-kind transfer to get it. (Finkelstein and
Hendren, 2020) These issues relate to measuring how much the policy increases
the welfare of the recipients.
In addition, the MWTP, i.e. the marginal value created, may differ from the
spending on the policy if there are market failures that the policy is able to address.
For example, there may be externalities to others than the direct beneficiaries of the
policy. In this case the total MWTP of all the beneficiaries needs to be measured.
In addition, the direct beneficiaries may be willing to pay more than the spending
on the policy if the policy can reduce the impact of market failures. Hendren
(2016); Finkelstein and Hendren (2020) For instance, if the first-employee subsidy
creates new jobs for people who would otherwise not be able to get jobs, the
increased welfare of the new employees adds to the total MWTP. Furthermore, if
the first-employee subsidy helps entrepreneurs overcome liquidity constraints and
2 Here I abstract from social preferences to different groups of individuals for simplicity. However,
conventional welfare weights for groups can be easily included to weight the marginal willingness
to pay of different groups. This may be needed especially when a policy affects the welfare of
different groups of people. Alternatively, one can calculate the MVPFs for each group separately
and compare them.
3 See e.g. Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018) and Farhi and Gabaix (2018) for a behavioral public
economics welfare evaluation.
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become employers, the subsidy may help them increase profits by more than the
subsidy. In this case, the subsidy amount understates the MWTP for the subsidy.
Consequently, the causal effects of the policy on the income of the new employees
and the entrepreneur need to be known to calculate the MWTP.
To summarize, the causal effects of a policy can be used to calculate the MVPF
of a particular policy that measures how effectively the policy increases welfare.
Consequently, the framework allows for welfare evaluation of a policy and com-
paring the welfare effects of different policies. For example, the MVPFs of tax
policy changes can be used evaluate the welfare effects. This allows us, for exam-
ple, to measure the difference in the welfare effects of two policies or to evaluate
the benefits of a policy compared to the costs of raising funds using a different
policy.
Consider as an example increasing tax rates to finance a subsidy for hiring the
first employee. First, the MVPF of increasing tax rates can be calculated using
only the causal effect on taxable income.4 This is because the MWTP of increas-
ing taxes equals the tax increase, which can be normalized to one. Then, the
MVPF is defined by the policy elasticity or the elasticity of taxable income. Let
us assume a fiscal externality of 0.35 which means that one euro of mechanical tax
increase decreases taxes paid by 0.3, thus the net increase in taxes is 0.7. Then,
the MVPF of a tax rate change amounting to one euro is 1.43. Now, this can be
compared to the MVPF of the first-employee subsidy. Unfortunately, the results I
find in the study of the effects do not allow the fiscal externality to be calculated6.
Consequently, the following calculation is not based on empirical estimates but
is purely a demonstration. Let us assume that the subsidy does not decrease any
market frictions, so that the benefits of the subsidy are equal to the mechanical
cost of the subsidy. Then, the MWTP is equal to one. Assume that for 20% of the
firms that used the subsidy the subsidy increases the taxes paid by 50%, in total by
10%. Thus, the fiscal externality is 0.1, leading to an MVPF of 1.11. With these
values, the cost of increasing one more euro of tax revenue is 1.42, which can
be compared to the benefit of providing a subsidy for hiring the first employee,
which is 1.11. This may not necessarily mean that the subsidy is not desirable.
The MVPFs only measure that the tax increase is “more expensive” than the value
provided by the subsidy. However, if the welfare of the beneficiaries of the sub-
sidy has a larger social welfare weight than the welfare of the taxed individuals,
this can still be desirable.
Notably, the fiscal externality may be larger than the mechanical cost of a pol-
icy. Then, the net cost is negative. In this case, the policy is self-financing and
4 With many simplifying assumptions such as no spillovers, see e.g. Saez, Slemrod and Giertz
(2012) and Hendren (2016).
5 Hendren (2016), suggests midpoints between 25 to 50%.
6 Due to a low observed take-up of the subsidy, I cannot credibly identify the results for the firms
that used the subsidy, which is needed for the MWTP.
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Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) define the MVPF as infinite. They also cal-
culate the MVPFs of various policies and find that the MVPFs of many policies
targeting education or children’s health are, indeed, infinite. These kinds of poli-
cies are self-financing investments, and they are desirable irrespective of social
values if the MWTP if positive. The MWTP can, however, also be negative. In
fact, this is the case with the example above of a tax increase, in which case the
cost is also negative (there is an increase in government revenue), so they cancel
out (Finkelstein and Hendren, 2020). However, it is possible that the spending
on the policy does not benefit anyone or even causes costs to people. This would
make the MVPF negative if the costs are positive.
To conclude, the framework for calculating the MVPF of a policy is a sim-
ple way to evaluate and compare the welfare effects of different policies. The
causal effect of the policy on government revenue is the key, and, in simple cases,
the sufficient statistic for the evaluation. In the case of large changes, external-
ities, or in-kind transfers measuring the MWTP require more assumptions and,
for instance, structural estimation or additional estimates of causal effects may be
needed. All in all, the framework clearly points out what causal effects of policies
need to be known to measure the welfare effects.
1.2 Causal identification of firm responses
This dissertation investigates the causal effects of tax policies on firms, which need
to be understood to evaluate their welfare consequences. As Finkelstein and Hen-
dren (2020) discuss, much of empirical work in economics in recent decades has
concentrated on identifying causal effects. Consequently, the evaluation frame-
work discussed above is useful and is undoubtedly motivated by the “credibility
revolution” in economics, meaning to the focus on causal identification methods.
The essays in this dissertation make use of the standard methodologies used for
causal identification since the credibility revolution.
Angrist and Pischke (2010) discuss how the credibility revolution in empirical
economics refers to a focus on a credible research design and utilizing more data.
These can be complementary: often a credible design is only feasible in the pres-
ence of large amount of data, especially panel data. Data availability is key for
economic research and determines what can be studied. For example, Almunia,
Harju, Kotakorpi, Tukiainen and Verho (2019) discuss how research can benefit
from access to administrative data. The essays in this dissertation make use of
administrative panel data on the full population of Finnish firms. This data has
many advantages: firms can be followed over time, the data is representative be-
cause it includes the full population, and the information is as reliable as possible
because it is the official information gathered and used by government authorities.
In particular, the tax return data that I use is the data that determines firms’ tax
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liability.
The experimental ideal or benchmark for identifying the causal effect is a ran-
domized trial (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Angrist and Pischke, 2010, Kremer,
2020). Random assignment of a treatment (or policy) ensures that the treatment
is independent of the outcome studied. Consequently, the difference between the
average outcome of the treatment group versus the control group equals the aver-
age causal effect. In fact, randomized experiments both in laboratories and in the
field have been widely used in economics (Harrison and List, 2004, Kremer, 2020)
because of the clean identification. Moreover, a randomized experiment works as
a benchmark for additional identification methods that exploit variation that is in
some sense “as good as random”.
The second essay in this dissertation relates to the methodological ideal of iden-
tifying a causal effect: the essay describes a randomized field experiment studying
the effects of subsidizing becoming an employer. The essay describes a plan for
an experiment to be conducted by the Finnish government. At the time of writing
this, the implementation and timing of the experiment are not yet certain. How-
ever, the essay provides a pre-trial plan, which is needed for transparency of the
analysis of experiments to be transparent, and describes the various aspects in
planning a field experiment. While the causal identification is simple, there are
many aspects to consider, from the choice of the experiment’s target group to the
sample size calculations and designing the treatment to ensure that the experiment
provides credible, relevant information on the policy.
In addition to randomized experiments, the identification of causal effects of-
ten uses so-called quasi-experiments or natural experiments (Angrist and Pischke,
2009, Angrist and Pischke, 2010). The idea is to find natural variation in a pol-
icy, for example a policy change that simulates random assignment in a specified
setting or for a limited group. Essentially, the idea is to find similar, comparable
groups that face a different policy. If there is no reason, other than the policy, for
the similar groups to have different outcomes, the difference between the groups
may identify the causal effect of the policy.
A canonical, and widely applied, example of an identification strategy in a
natural experiment is the difference-in-differences method (Angrist and Pischke,
2009, 2010; Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). This design exploits panel data and
a situation where there is a policy change for a group (treatment group) and no
change for a similar group (control group). The assumption behind the difference-
in-differences identification is common trends; the groups would have developed
similarly without the policy change.7 In this case, the development of the con-
7 Often additional assumptions of no spillovers and composition change are mentioned. Assump-
tion of no spillovers means that the policy does not affect the control group. Assumption of no
composition change means that the policy does not affect which individuals are in the groups or, in
other words, individuals cannot manipulate their treatment status. These are needed for the control
group to provide a counterfactual development, i.e., the development if there was no policy change.
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trol group is a counterfactual for the development of the treatment group if there
was no policy change, and the difference in the development or, in other words,
change in the difference (difference-in-differences) measures the effect of the pol-
icy. There can be a difference between the groups prior to the policy change –
the pre-policy difference between the groups accounts for it. All that is needed is
data before and after a policy change and a group comparable to the group that
experiences a policy change. Additional popular research designs utilizing natural
experiments include regression discontinuity and instrumental variables, which I
do not discuss here.
The first essay in this dissertation uses a standard difference-in-differences
identification strategy. The essay studies the effects of a regional first-employee
subsidy that was in force in Finland in 2007—2011. Consequently, there is a
change in a policy, i.e. the introduction of a new subsidy for firms in the subsidy
area, while the firms in the area without the subsidy are not eligible for a similar
subsidy. Thus, the effect can be identified by comparing the change in employment
between firms in the treatment (subsidy) area to firms in the control (no subsidy)
area. The assumption is that the firms in the areas would have developed similarly
without the subsidy, which I directly examine in the essay.
Extensive micro-level data can provide for a credible research design even
without a policy change or when a counterfactual is not readily available. Com-
mon research designs exploit e.g. i) variation in treatment timing (event-study) or
ii) matching techniques to make the treatment and control groups more compara-
ble. First, different individuals (or units) may be exposed to a policy at different
times. In these cases, a researcher may use an event study approach or so-called
“staggered” difference-in-differences, described in Borusyak and Jaravel (2021).
The event study approach relies on the randomness of the timing of the treatment.
Then, the effect of the treatment can be identified as the common change in out-
comes after the treatment for the individuals treated at different times. This is
enabled by the different treatment timing, because then the common time trend
can be accounted for. Staggered difference-in-differences means a difference-in-
differences strategy where the treated individuals are exposed to the treatment,
like a policy change, at different times. The identifying assumptions and chal-
lenges of these research designs are discussed in e.g. Borusyak and Jaravel (2021)
and Goodman-Bacon (2020). Notably, the treatment does not have to be a policy
change – it can be any event that affects the individual outcome and that satisfies
the identifying assumptions.
It should be noted that there are important differences between the stan-
dard difference-in-differences and the event study methods. Firstly, in canoni-
cal difference-in-differences the treatment assignment or the policy is at the group
level rather than the individual level. This means that the standard errors should be
corrected for the correlation within the groups (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan,
2004). In the event study, the assignment to treatment is at the individual level.
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Secondly, the identifying assumptions are somewhat different when there is vari-
ation in treatment timing. In the standard difference-in-differences, the parallel
trends assumption implies similar development over time without the treatment.
In an event study without a control group, the identifying assumption is that the
timing of the event is random, i.e. there is no change related to the timing of the
event. Staggered difference-in-differences or an event study with a control group
rely on similar development of the treatment and control groups relative to the
timing of the treatment, not just over time. Many recent papers (e.g., Borusyak
and Jaravel, 2021 and Goodman-Bacon, 2020) discuss the assumptions and the
appropriate methodologies when using variation in treatment timing.
Secondly, matching is a common method for improving comparability between
treated and non-treated groups based on observable variables (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2009; Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). There are many different matching tech-
niques, but the idea is to pre-process the data so that the treatment and control
groups are similar to each other, except for the treatment status. This is supposed
to account for the selection into treatment, i.e. that some individuals end up in the
treatment group because of their characteristics. Now, if the difference in char-
acteristics before the treatment is accounted for by the matching, the difference
between the treatment and control groups may identify the effect of the treatment.
The availability of extensive data is key for successful matching: differences in
characteristics can only be reduced to the extent of the observable characteristics,
thus data on many variables is needed.
The third essay in this dissertation makes use of matching methods combined
with staggered difference-in-differences (or event study with a control group) to
identify the effect of tax audits, which are specific firm-level events. Consequently,
the treatment is not a policy change but the event of being audited as a part of reg-
ular auditing policy. The research design is enabled by unique data that combines
the firm population tax returns with information on firm tax audits to identify the
tax audit events of firms and the development of these over time relative to the
audit year. The development of the audited firms around the audit is compared
to the development of non-audited firms around a randomly assigned fixed point
in time. In other words, we have assigned a “pseudo audit” for the non-audited
firms to analyze their development relative to a fixed year. Using a Coarsened
Exact Matching (CEM) method (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012), the estimation is
restricted to firms similar in their observable variables prior to the audit (or the
pseudo audit for the non-audited firms). The matching is crucial for improving
the comparability of the audited and non-audited firms because they differ in their
characteristics and development prior to being audited. The identification method,
then, is the difference-in-differences method, which identifies the change in devel-
opment between the audited and non-audited firms after the (pseudo) audit. The
assumption behind the identification method is the common trends relative to the
audit year, which is examined in the essay.
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1.3 Mechanisms of the response and compliance
Firms can respond to tax policy in different ways, e.g. changes in (real) revenue,
substituting labor for capital, or changing their compliance with a policy. In addi-
tion, tax policy has multiple dimensions including the tax base, tax rate, salience,
and compliance costs, which firms may respond to (Gillitzer and Slemrod, 2014).
Consequently, this dissertation, as well as most empirical studies, is interested in
the mechanisms of the observed responses – the “why” and “how” behind the re-
sponse. However, the causal effect on government revenue is the only response
needed for welfare evaluation, as described above in section 1.1. Is there, then,
any other reason to study the mechanisms than academic curiosity in understand-
ing the response?
In effect, understanding the mechanisms can make the empirical results useful
in improving or evaluating future policies and not only in revealing the welfare
effects of existing or past policies. This is due to an embedded limitation of causal
identification: only the effect of a specific treatment can be estimated. This is
referred to as the external validity of the results – results in any empirical study
only show the effect in the context of the study, which may not be the same as the
effect in another context. Consequently, the causal effect is sufficient for ex post
policy evaluation, i.e. evaluation after the adoption of the policy. Understand-
ing the mechanisms is necessary for ex ante policy evaluation. For this purpose,
more structural estimation strategies may be helpful to construct the counterfac-
tual before the adoption of a policy (Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). In addition, the
mechanisms may help to identify the MWTP, as discussed above in section 1.1.
Related to understanding the mechanisms of the response is understanding the
treatment; in other words, the effect of what is measured. As mentioned briefly
above, tax policy includes many aspects. Gillitzer and Slemrod (2014) describe
a tax system including, for example, compliance costs (costs of reporting taxes),
salience (how transparent the tax system is, or how well the tax rates are known
by individuals), remittance and withholding (the agent responsible for collecting
the tax), and enforcement (punishments for non-compliance, tax monitoring by
authorities) in addition to the more canonical aspects of the tax base (what is taxed)
and the tax rate. Consequently, a tax policy treatment can include many different
“treatments” if multiple aspects change simultaneously. This can be controlled for
in a randomized trial but not in a natural experiment. Even when the effect of one
change can be isolated, the other aspects of the policy can affect interpretation of
the results. For example, a tax rate change may not be equal to price change if
there are compliance effects or imperfect salience. For example, Chetty, Looney
and Kroft (2009) show that people react differently to tax changes depending on
the salience of the tax. Subsidy programs in particular often include many aspects:
a firm may be eligible for a price decrease but there may be compliance costs or
salience issues. These issues complicate interpretation of the results.
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Firm compliance with tax policy is a specific theme addressed in this disser-
tation. Compliance, in essence, refers to whether the firm behaves in accordance
with the tax policy or not. For example, tax compliance refers to reporting taxes
correctly and, accordingly, paying the correct amount of taxes. In this case, non-
compliance is illegal and subject to punishment. The third essay in this paper
directly studies tax non-compliance and tax audits as a tool for improving compli-
ance. However, compliance can also be voluntary. For example, using subsidies
is not compulsory but, in a sense, not using an available policy is non-compliance
with the policy. The first essay addresses this type of non-compliance or under-use
of the first-employee subsidy as a potential reason for the observed effects. In ad-
dition, randomized experiments need to account for the potential non-compliance
with the treatment, which means that not all individuals in the treatment group
comply with the treatment.
For example, the first-employee subsidy, studied in the first essay, creates an
incentive for firms to become employers by reducing the net labor costs of the first
employee. However, this price decrease is not the only component of the policy,
because i) the subsidy had to be applied for, and ii) the eligible employment con-
tracts for receiving the subsidy were restricted. First, the subsidy had to be applied
for, meaning that a firm has to know about the subsidy to experience the price de-
crease, and the firm may face administrative costs in applying for and using the
subsidy. Consequently, the salience and compliance costs of the policy may affect
firms’ responses. Second, the subsidy restricted the type of employment contract,
which increases the compliance costs. Importantly, these are issues that are di-
rectly affected by the policy design. Hence, the compliance response is important
for interpretation of the observed firm responses and for guiding future policy.
In fact, the second essay uses the results on compliance provided in the first
essay in designing the treatment in the experiment. The subsidy for becoming
an employer in the experiment is supposed to have lower administrative costs,
be more salient, and have no restrictions on the type of employment contract.
This can make the subsidy more effective in decreasing the costs of becoming an
employer and, consequently, be more effective. The plan for the experiment also
examines how compliance affects the credibility of the experiment as measured by
the statistical power.
In contrast, the third essay directly studies tax compliance by firms and the
effectiveness of tax audits in increasing tax compliance. The essay studies the
mechanisms behind the response, which may shed light on the source of tax non-
compliance. This, in turn, can help in targeting the tax administration’s resources.
In addition, studying the anatomy of the response may be directly relevant for
fiscal externality if there are effects on the reporting of multiple tax bases.
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2 EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES
There is a wide literature in public and labor economics that studies the effects of
employment incentives since Kaldor (1936) suggested wage subsidies as a means
to reduce unemployment. Employment incentives refer to public policies meant
to increase the demand for or supply of labor, usually by subsidies or tax reduc-
tions. Accordingly, there are various types of policies with different goals.8 For
example, there are subsidies (or tax reductions) targeted at specific groups of em-
ployees, such as young, old or low-wage individuals (studied in e.g. Huttunen,
Pirttilä and Uusitalo, 2013; Kaiser and Kuhn, 2016; Groh, Krishnan, Mckenzie
and Vishwanath, 2016; and Saez, Schoefer and Seim, 2019b,a). In addition, active
labor market policies, which are policies meant to support the unemployed to find
jobs or those at risk of losing their jobs to retain them, often include wage subsi-
dies targeted at the individuals (see e.g. Card, Kluve and Weber, 2010, and Brown
and Koettl, 2015 for reviews of active labor market policies).
Additionally, employment incentives are sometimes targeted at firms to en-
courage job creation or decrease the destruction of jobs. These can be general
job-creation subsidies (Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés, 2010) or, for example,
regionally targeted tax subsidies (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo, 2009; Bennmarker,
Mellander and Ockert, 2009). Employment incentives targeted at firms are of
specific interest during economic depressions as they can help to reduce labor
market separations during the depression and thus accelerate the recovery (Neu-
mark, 2013; Cahuc, Carcillo and Le Barbanchon, 2019; Bruhn, 2020; Benzarti and
Harju, 2021). In fact, during the COVID-19 crisis, employment subsidies were
widely used to encourage firms to retain employment (e.g. Hamilton 2020 and
Neilson, Humphries and Ulyssea 2020 study subsidies during COVID-19). This
can be helpful if labor market separations are decreased because losing a job can
result in long-term unemployment if finding a new job is difficult, as it is during
depressions. Long-term unemployment, in turn, can result in loss of human capi-
tal or reduced employer perception of labor productivity. For example, Saez et al.
(2019a) find permanent employment effects from a temporary employer payroll
tax reduction on youth workers.
In a simple theoretical framework of a partial labor market equilibrium model,
a wage subsidy (or a similar decrease in labor taxes) decreases the cost of labor
increasing labor, demand (or in the case of a subsidy to the individual increases the
net wage, increasing labor supply). Then, the subsidy increases employment and
8 See e.g. Brown, Merkl and Snower (2011) for an evaluation of different policies.
25
wages, with the sizes of these effects depending on the labor demand and supply
elasticities. In addition, employers can substitute using more employment instead
of capital as the relative price of labor decreases. If the wage subsidy is targeted at
a specific group of employees, it also reduces the relative labor costs of this group
compared to other groups of employees. This can cause employers to substitute
subsidized employees instead of the non-subsidized group. Often wage subsidies
affect only a small number of jobs in the labor market. In this case the effects are
concentrated in the subsidized firms and employees, and increases in wages are
less likely (because the labor supply for the specific subsidized jobs is elastic due
to the large amount of non-subsidized jobs).
However, the simple model ignores many potential margins of response. The
effects can differ for two main reasons i) imperfections in the labor market and
ii) the features of the subsidy design make it different from a pure price decrease.
Firstly, there are many imperfections in the labor markets that can affect the effec-
tiveness of employment incentives. For example, liquidity-constrained firms may
use the extra cash provided by the incentives to grow their business. In addition,
pay equity concerns or labor market regulations may prevent firms from paying a
wage according to the labor productivity of an employee. Then, a wage subsidy
may reduce the gap between the wage and labor productivity. For example, the
results in Saez et al. (2019b) support these mechanisms. Secondly, many wage
subsidies include administrative costs or may not be fully salient, which may de-
crease their effectiveness. Also, some employee-targeted wage subsidies or vouch-
ers may include signals of lower labor productivity or stigma so that employees
are less willing to use them, or employers may not be willing to hire employees
with these subsidies. For example, Brown (2015) mentions employer take-up as
important.
Consequently, the effects of wage subsidies are largely dependent on the many
potential responses by firms. Recently there have been many studies on the ef-
fects on firms of employment subsidies or payroll tax reductions. The evidence
is quite mixed, which may support the importance of policy design as well as
the complexity in firm responses. For example, Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009)
Bennmarker et al. (2009) Betcherman et al. (2010) study the effects of employ-
ment incentives targeted at firms. The estimated effects in Korkeamäki and Uusi-
talo (2009) and Bennmarker et al. (2009) are moderate or insignificant. On the
other hand, Betcherman et al. (2010) find a significant increase in employment,
which may, however, be largely due to job formalization rather than increased
real employment. Cahuc et al. (2019) study the effects of a hiring credit during
a depression, finding significant employment effects. Benzarti and Harju (2021)
find that a payroll tax reduction had limited effect prior to an economic recession,
but increased employment and sales in the firms affected during the recession.
Kangasharju (2007) and Lombardi, Nordström Skans and Vikström (2018) find
positive effects on the firm performance of wage subsidies for the unemployed,
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but Lechner, Wunsch and Scioch (2013) find they may even harm firms. Saez
et al. (2019b) find that a payroll tax reduction for young people increased youth
employment, and increased the growth of firms through larger windfall gains, but
Huttunen et al. (2013) find moderate employment effects from a wage subsidy for
older low-wage workers, mainly increasing the hours of those already employed.
Additionally, many papers study the effects of employment incentives in devel-
oped countries. For example, Mckenzie, Woodruff and De Mel (2019) study the
effects of a wage subsidy on micro firms. Grimm and Paffhausen (2015) survey
the evidence of different policies targeted at small and medium-sized firms.
2.1 Overview of essay 1
The first essay studies the effects on firm outcomes of subsidizing the first em-
ployee, using a regional subsidy program in Finland in 2007-2011 as a natural
experiment. Firms in the subsidy area were eligible for a subsidy that amounted to
30% of the wage costs of the first employee in the first year and 15% in the second
year if they hired the employee on a permanent contract with at least 25 hours of
work per week. To be eligible, the firm had to have had no employees for at least
12 months. The subsidy targeted a large group of firms: over half of Finnish firms
do not have employees other than the entrepreneur.
The essay makes use of register data on the full population of firm tax returns
in 2000-2013 and the subsidy grant decisions. By combining the data on firm
outcomes with the subsidy decisions, I am able to study the take-up of the subsidy
among the firms that became employers while eligible for the subsidy.
By comparing the firms in the eligible area to firms in the similar neighboring
but ineligible area, I find that the subsidy had zero effect on the probability of
becoming an employer and additional firm outcomes. The estimates are precisely
estimated and there are no large differences between the types of firms studied.
The zero estimated effect seems to be due to a low take-up of only 2% among
the eligible firms that became employers. This raises a puzzle as to why firms do
not use the subsidy. Calculating the ex post monetary gains of using the subsidy, I
find that firms with larger gains are more likely to use the subsidy, but the take-up
rate increases to at most 12% for firms with an ex post calculated subsidy between
€8,000 and €12,000. By comparing the subsidized firms to firms that did not use
the subsidy, I find descriptive evidence to support low awareness as a reason for
the low take-up rather than administrative costs of using the subsidy. Furthermore,
the restriction to full-time employment seems to be an important reason for the
low take-up. The full-time restriction increases the opportunity costs of using the
subsidy for firms that are only willing to hire their first employee on a temporary
or part-time employment contract.
The essay contributes to the literature that studies how firms respond to em-
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ployment incentives. Firstly, it is the first paper, to my knowledge, to study the
effects of employment incentives specifically on the probability of becoming an
employer among non-employer firms. This is important, as non-employer firms
form the majority of all firms in Finland and large shares in other countries as well.
Previously, Lechmann and Wunder (2017) and Fairlie and Miranda (2016) have
studied the probability and dynamics of becoming an employer. Secondly, the
paper raises firm take-up of subsidies and employment incentives as an important
issue, and this has received little attention in previous literature. Relatedly, Neilson
et al. (2020) show that small firms are less likely and slower to take up paycheck
protection program loans, and incomplete take-up especially among smaller firms
is mentioned in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) and Huttunen et al. (2013). In
fact, policy design is an important factor in the effectiveness of employment incen-
tives. The low take-up puzzle is also related to recent studies providing evidence
that firms seem to make mistakes (e.g. Zwick and Almunia, Hjort, Knebelmann
and Tian 2020).
2.2 Overview of essay 2
The second essay sets out a plan for a large-scale field experiment to study how
firms respond to a subsidy for becoming an employer. The experiment is designed
to be conducted by the Finnish government as close as possible to a policy that
could be implemented as a universal policy. Hence, the experiment could provide
evidence for evaluating the policy prior to its full implementation.
In planning the experiment, the paper uses full population tax return data to
describe the population of non-employer firms. This can be used to assess how
to target the subsidy and provide estimates for calculating the statistical power of
the experiment. The same data can be used to identify the target population when
running the experiment and the statistical analysis of the experiment.
In the experiment, firms picked from tax registers that had no employees for at
least 12 months are randomized to receive eligibility for i) a recruitment subsidy,
ii) training or iii) no treatment in order to serve as a control group. The recruitment
subsidy equals 50% of the actualized labor costs in the first year up to a maximum
of €10,000. The subsidy is paid automatically according to information provided
by the firm for payroll taxation, after the firm has claimed the subsidy. The design
of the subsidy is supposed to have minimal administrative costs for the firm, and
consequently make it more attractive to firms than the previous first-employee
subsidy described above. The training is aimed at helping the firm to become an
employer (such as information on the legal responsibilities of employers) and can
be customized for firms.
The preliminary budget and assumed take-up rates enable the recruitment sub-
sidy to be offered to 13,087 firms and training to 14,700. Based on these numbers
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and descriptive statistics from the data, the calculated minimum detectable effect
(MDE) on the probability of becoming an employer is 11% for the subsidy and
10.5% for the training treatment. The paper confirms the validity of the statis-
tical power calculations by simulating the power using bootstrap samples of the
empirical data. The paper also assesses the multiple hypothesis correction using
simulations.
The main contribution of the second essay is a public plan for a field exper-
iment that serves the transparency of conducting randomized experiments. The
paper proposes an approach of dividing the experiment into stages, to manage the
uncertainty of subsidy take-up. It also presents descriptive evidence on the popu-
lation of non-employer firms and the probability of becoming an employer. If the
experiment is run, it could shed light on how firms respond to a subsidy for becom-
ing an employer. This complements the results from the first essay, by showing
how the program design affects the effectiveness of the subsidy. The experiment
could be used to evaluate the effects of a potential policy program that aiming to
reduce the costs of becoming an employer so as to increase job creation.
3 TAX EVASION
Recently, there has been increasing interest in public economics in studying tax
compliance or tax evasion. Gillitzer and Slemrod (2014) describe tax compliance
as an important feature of tax systems, and Slemrod (2019) states that the topic
of tax evasion is related to the “bread and butter concerns of public economics”,
as tax compliance affects the efficiency and equity of the a system. Tax evasion
refers to illegal forms of reducing tax liability, usually by misreporting economic
activity. Tax compliance is the opposite: the true reporting of activity that deter-
mines correct tax liability. Tax evasion is related but needs to be distinguished
from tax avoidance or tax planning, which refers to legal activities for reducing
tax liability, e.g. by shifting income between different tax bases. In addition, tax
non-compliance can refer to intentional and unintentional misreporting. Empiri-
cal study of tax evasion is challenging because tax evasion is, by definition, not
observed in administrative records. However, as Slemrod (2019) describes, access
to administrative data, new methods and cooperation with tax authorities have led
to an increase in credible empirical studies on tax evasion. Especially, random au-
dits and “traces” of income have been used to study the extent of tax evasion (e.g.
Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen and Saez, 2011; Artavani, Morse and Tsout-
soura, 2016), and studies using randomized field experiments or random audits
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(Kleven et al., 2011; Gemmell and Ratto, 2012; Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal,
2017; Bérgolo, Ceni, Cruces, Giaccobasso and Perez-truglia, 2017) to study the
effects of tax enforcement.
The canonical model of tax evasion is set out in Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
In the model, individuals have income, pay taxes on their reported income, face the
possibility of an audit and a punishment if they are caught evading taxes. Based on
these, individuals choose the optimal reported income. The probability of an audit
and the punishment are tax enforcement tools that crucially determine the extent
of tax evasion for a given tax rate. The model alone is not able to explain high
levels of tax compliance and the low tax audit rates observed in many developed
countries. Consequently, there are theoretical suggestions that aim to explain the
lack of tax evasion, e.g. in terms of moral considerations.
Recent theoretical and empirical evidence emphasizes the role of third-party
reporting in tax compliance. In particular, Kleven et al. (2011) use randomized
tax audits in Denmark to document very high levels of tax compliance for third-
party reported income but lower levels of compliance for self-reported income
such as income from self-employment. Third-party reporting of income, for ex-
ample wage income reporting by an employer, allows the tax administration to
easily detect tax evasion when an individual’s reported income does not match
with an employer’s reports. For this reason, tax enforcement of self-employed
persons, who report their own income, is especially challenging. Consequently,
reporting and remittance rules are important tax enforcement tools in the tax sys-
tem. For example, VAT is often argued to be self-enforcing due to the feature that
a firm’s sales are expenses for another firm. Consequently, firms report their ex-
penses to reduce tax liability. This can provide an incentive for the seller to report
sales in order not to get caught for tax evasion. This feature, however, has some
weak links, especially when the firm sells to final consumers rather than other
firms (see e.g. Naritomi, 2019).
Because of the role of third-party reporting, firms have a central role in overall
tax compliance. Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2016) even argue that tax compliance
and firm size in an economy are connected, because collusive tax evasion is more
difficult to maintain in large firms. Consequently, there is an increasing interest
in studying the tax compliance of firms and their interaction with employees and
consumers. For example, Bérgolo et al. (2017) and Carrillo et al. (2017) use field
experiments to study how firm tax reporting responds to communications sent
by the tax authority. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018) study the effects of
monitoring intensity on firm tax compliance in Spain. In addition, Naritomi (2019)
studies tax enforcement of VAT by incentivizing consumers to report purchases in
exchange for lottery tickets in Brazil. Bjørneby, Alstadsæter and Telle (2018) use
randomized tax audits to study collusive tax evasion between firms and employees
in Norway.
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3.1 Overview of essay 3
The third essay studies how firms respond to real-life tax audits using data on
operational tax audits combined with firm tax returns in Finland. Based on the-
ory, it is not clear how firms respond. A tax audit may cause a firm to update
its perceived probability of an audit either upwards or downwards, which would
increase or decrease future tax compliance, respectively. If a tax audit increases
tax compliance, it increases the effective tax rate faced by a firm, which may have
a negative real effect on the firm’s business activity. In addition, tax audits are
costly. Consequently, the effectiveness of tax audits is an empirical question but
there is limited evidence in the literature on how firms respond to tax audits.
The essay makes use of novel data on all operational tax audits in Finland in
2003-2016. This data is combined with the full population of firm tax returns
in Finland in 2000-2016. Importantly, this makes it possible to follow the au-
dited and non-audited firms over time. In the interest of introducing new data,
we describe the audited firms and audit outcomes in some detail. In the paper,
we construct a control group for the audited firms using CEM matching. Then,
we use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to estimate how the audited
firms respond to being audited relative to a similar group of firms, with similar tax
return development that do not get audited.
We find a statistically significant, immediate and persistent increase of 13.5%
in firm profits for five years following an audit (including the audit year). The
response in profits seems to be rather due to an increase in reported revenue than
a decrease in costs, which implies under-reporting of revenue as a channel of tax
evasion. We find that the audited firms with a positive detected tax deficit have
a larger increase in profits, but there is a small decrease in their probability of
reporting positive profits and revenue. This may be a sign of a negative real effect
due to the higher effective tax rates. Consistent with evasion of payroll taxes or
collusive evasion of income taxes with employees, we find an increase in reported
labor costs and the number of employees following an audit.
The essay contributes to the literature on the effects of tax enforcement tools
on firm tax compliance. The paper adds to the limited literature on firm responses
to tax audits. Importantly, the paper studies how firms respond to operational tax
audits, which are the usual tax enforcement tool. The effects of random audits are
studied more, but the effects may differ because i) the response may be different
if the firm knows it is being audited by random and ii) the target group may be
different. Previously, the effects have been studied in DeBacker, Heim, Tran and
Yuskavage (2015) and D’Agosto, Manzo, Pisani and D’Arcangelo (2018). The
advantage of the essay compared to previous studies is the availability of the full
population of audited and non-audited firms and an extensive analysis of tax return
outcomes. The evidence on firm responses to operational tax audits can comple-
ment the literature using random audits or field experiments (Bjørneby et al., 2018;
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Carrillo et al., 2017; Bérgolo et al., 2017). The empirical evidence is directly rel-
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